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HOW I BECAME A CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHER 
Ralph McInerny 
I began graduate studies in philosophy at the University of Minnesota in 
the Fall quarter of 1951. My undergraduate philosophy had been done in 
the St. Paul Seminary where I had a number of professors who had 
taken their degrees at Laval University under Charles DeKoninck. In 
those days Laval was a redoubt of Thomism of the strict observance and 
my ultimate intention was to go there. But, having decided not to return 
to the seminary it was more immediately practical to enroll at 
Minnesota. Like so many decisions along the way of life, this was one 
made in obscurity and without any notion of its importance. But it was, I 
think, providential. 
Minnesota was then in a golden age. Herbert Feigl, Wilfrid Sellars, 
John Hospers, and May Brodbeck formed the analytic/positivist main 
group in the department. D. B. Terrell, who was to become an expert on 
Brentano, was the youngster of the department. And Paul Holmer was 
already massively sui generis and for many of us a mentor. I wrote my 
master's dissertation with Holmer and am eternally grateful to him for 
introducing me to Kierkegaard. Minnesota was on the quarter system so 
one took a great many courses: I took four each from Sellars and 
Holmer, had logic from Brodbeck, contemporary philosophy with 
Terrill, and minored in classics. 
That year at Minnesota established three points of reference for my 
philosophizing. The first was supplied by such dominant figures as Feigl 
and Sellars, heirs of the Vienna Circle, and champions of a philosophy 
that snuggled up as close as possible to science, hopeful that some of its 
prestige would rub off on its own lesser efforts. Holmer on the other 
hand taught courses in Jaspers, in Kierkegaard, in Cassirer, that provid-
ed an alternative to the analytic element. Above all, Holmer's courses 
intimated when they did not assert the role of religious faith in the 
philosopher's enterprise. The third point on the triangle was Thomism. 
Sellars, with whom I studied Descartes, Leibniz and Kant, was amused 
by papers in which I sought to juxtapose Kant and Aquinas, Descartes 
and Thomism. He was certain that immersion in the empiricists would 
be my salvation. My dissertation was called A Thomistic Evaluation of 
Kierkegaard. Without fully realizing it, I was undertaking to philosophize 
thomistically but with constant reference to the secularizing philoso-
phizing of Feigl/Sellars and the Christian fideism of a Holmer. I went on 
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to Laval where I took my doctorate under DeKoninck and deepened my 
understanding of St. Thomas. 
After a year at Creighton, I joined the philosophy department at 
Notre Dame in 1955. During my first years here-I think of them now as 
pre conciliar years-there was a common effort to work from a shared 
Thomistic base in the direction of ongoing contemporary philosophy 
with an eye to finding a distinctive synthesis of the best of the best. That 
was predicated on sharing a common basis, an assumption that would 
be destroyed by the attitude induced by Vatican II. In the mid-1960s 
many who had hitherto been committed Thomists suddenly announced 
that they were through with all that and must now be thought of as ana-
lytic philosophers, existentialists, phenomenologists, Whiteheadians, etc. 
At its lowest level, there was an unseemly desire to join whatever was 
taken to be in the philosophical ascendancy. We ended up with variety 
but no rationale for it. I wrote Thomism in all Age of RCllelual in 1966 and it 
can serve as a contemporary record of those days. 
When the Fellowship of Christian Scholars was formed I came to it 
out of a different background than believers who had, let us say, accept-
ed as good money what they had learned in graduate school and only 
later came to see that the dominant views posed difficulties for their 
Christian beliefs. As neophytes, we were confronted by the received 
opinion, more assumed than expressed, that the serious pursuit of phi-
losophy would lead inevitably to the fading away of religious faith. 
Discussions of "religious language," the defenses even more than the 
attacks, offered a stone rather than bread to the believing philosopher. 
And of course we were all supposed to know that attempts to prove the 
existence of God must fail, there being no God. 
Believing philosophers needed air, they needed space in which they 
could reflect in a receptive, not a hostile, way on their beliefs and on the 
relations of faith and philosophy. It had become tiresome to spend so 
much time showing that you were not speaking nonsense. It was alto-
gether too much like being asked if one had stopped beating one's wife. 
What was needed was a coming together of philosophers for whom faith 
was not an embarrassment or impediment to philosophy, but its spur 
and support. There was need for a Society of Christian Philosophers. 
The effort took two main forms. First, there was the tu quoque or "So's 
your old man" approach. Some of the hilarious assumptions of propo-
nents of a secularized philosophy had to be displayed to public amuse-
ment. No one is more adept at this than Al Plantinga, a sign of which is 
that the procedure came to be called alvinizing. One who professed to 
find insuperable difficulties in the existence of God was shown that he 
must then have similar difficulties with other minds. The second form 
was illustrated by the introduction of topics such as atonement and the 
Trinity and the like to the philosophical agenda on the assumption that 
there was no law preventing a philosopher from turning his mind to 
these. It is here that I must confess I have misgivings about our success. 
To put it Thomistically, I think there has often been a blurring of the 
distinction between philosophy and theology. If philosophy is discourse 
that pins itself to truths that are in the public domain, so that an argu-
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ment must always be hooked up to the things that in principle every-
body knows, those being the starting points or principles of philosophy, 
theology pins itself to truths that are taken to be such on the basis of 
divine faith, e.g. the Incarnation, Trinity, atonement, etc. Discussion of 
these by philosophers can suggest that there are principles in the public 
domain sufficient to guide one in such discussions. But of course there is 
nothing here to discuss of a truth-bearing kind apart from faith. It is rev-
elation that delivers such truths to us and the grace of faith is the name 
for the acceptance of them as true. But this is to pin one's arguments to 
truths that are not in the public domain, that is, what any mind can in 
principle be taken to know. 
One reaction to this is to say that Augustine was not as demanding as 
Thomas and seems to jumble up philosophy and faith without hesita-
tion. This is a large matter, of course, but in the end it seems to me to 
amount to a decision to engage in theology rather than philosophy-but 
without a net. The net would be an overt appeal to revelation. 
I should add that there are many Thomists nowadays who downplay 
the difference between philosophy and theology, and who suggest that 
there can be no such thing as Thomistic philosophy. Another large sub-
ject and one that I shall address in my Gifford lectures at Glasgow in '99. 
The bright side to this is that it becomes inescapable that reflections on 
the Trinity and Incarnation, those at any rate that are truth-bearing, 
begin with the truth of those mysteries. With faith. With revelation. We 
as a society have had occasion to encounter head-on the chaos of biblical 
scholarship. As a Catholic, I find a reading of Vatican II's Dei verbum an 
indispensable guide in these matters. Charlotte AIIen's forthcoming 
book (Free Press) The Human Christ: The Quest for the Historical Jesus 
makes all too clear what can be expected from the soi-disant experts in 
this area. Kierkegaard cited Lichtenburg on the Bible: "Such books are 
mirrors, if a monkey looks in, no apostle looks out." 
One finds in St. Anselm the teaching that the souls of the blessed are 
meant to take the places left vacant in heaven by the fallen angels. When 
I look at the post-conciliar history of the Catholic church, particularly in 
universities, I am gripped with an Anselmian hope that philosophers 
will flow from the society to take the places of those of my generation 
who have been such inadequate custodians of the faith. Ut unum sint, as 
Our Lord prayed. May they be one. 
University of Notre Dame 
